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Abstract
We provide a behavioral foundation to the notion of ‘mixture’ of acts, which is used
to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by Anscombe and Aumann [1].
Our construction allows one to formulate mixture-space axioms even in a fully sub-
jective setting, without assuming the existence of randomizing devices. This simplifies
the task of developing axiomatic models which only use behavioral data. Moreover, it
is immune from the difficulty that agents may ‘distort’ the probabilities associated with
randomizing devices.
For illustration, we present simple subjective axiomatizations of some models of choice
under uncertainty, including the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler
[11], and Bewley’s model of choice with incomplete preferences [2].
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A Subjective Spin on Roulette Wheels∗
Paolo Ghirardato Fabio Maccheroni Massimo Marinacci
Marciano Siniscalchi
Introduction
The axiomatizations of subjective expected utility (SEU) of Savage [18] and Anscombe
and Aumann [1, AA for short] are often contrasted in terms of their analytical complexity
and behavioral content.
In particular, Savage explicitly aimed at constructing a theory that relies solely upon
purely behavioral data—preferences among acts, i.e. maps assigning consequences to
states. In contrast, the AA approach requires assuming the existence of pre-assigned,
‘objective’ probabilities. However, the latter is much more amenable to mathematical
treatment than Savage’s approach, as it allows for a direct application of familiar vector
space techniques.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible to reconstruct the
AA setting in a fully behavioral fashion; this places models that follow the AA approach
on comparable epistemological footing with those that follow Savage’s, at virtually no
cost in terms of analytical tractability.
As noted above, Savage’s purpose was to show that subjective probability and util-
ity can be derived without assuming the existence of extraneous devices characterized
by ‘objective’ probabilities, or ‘ethically neutral’ events. This independence from non-
behavioral data makes it relatively easy to test the assumptions and implications of the
theory; arguably, such features have been instrumental in making SEU maximization the
reference model in economic theory.
∗An earlier version of this paper was circulated with the title “Subjective Foundations for Objec-
tive Randomization: A New Spin on Roulette Wheels”. We thank Mark Machina and the audi-
ences at the V SAET Conference (Ischia, July 2001) and the RUD 2001 Conference (Venezia, July
2001) for helpful comments. Maccheroni thanks the Department of Economics at Boston Univer-
sity and the Division of HSS at Caltech, while Siniscalchi thanks the MEDS Department at the
Kellogg Graduate School of Management (Northwestern University), for their hospitality while this
paper was being written. The authors’ e-mail addresses are respectively: paolo@hss.caltech.edu;
fabio.maccheroni@uni-bocconi.it; massimo@econ.unito.it; marciano@princeton.edu.
Anscombe and Aumann suggested abandoning Savage’s general setting and allowing
payoffs to be lotteries contingent on the behavior of a randomizing device, which they
called a ‘roulette wheel’. They observed that the roulette wheel enables one to define
‘objective mixtures’ of acts, and hence to extend the axiomatics of von Neumann and
Morgenstern [21] to the case in which the probabilities of the (non-roulette) events are
not objective.
This considerably simplifies the axiomatic derivation of the SEU model. The presence
of mixtures makes the set of acts a convex subset of a vector space: If the decision maker’s
preferences conform to expected utility over the ‘roulette wheel acts’,1 the utility profile
corresponding to the ‘objective mixture’ of two acts is the convex combination of the
utility profiles of the latter. Such algebraic structure may be exploited in the formulation
of the axioms, as well as in the construction of the mathematical representation.
Appropriate extensions of the AA setting also simplify the development of models
that address well-known descriptive limitations of the SEU representation (see, e.g, Luce
[13, Chap. 3]). Many of the most successful extensions of SEU were first carried out in
an AA-type setting: among others, we mention Schmeidler’s ‘Choquet expected utility’
(CEU) model [19], Gilboa and Schmeidler’s ‘maxmin expected utility’ (MEU) model [11],
and Bewley’s model [2] of choice with incomplete preferences.2
However, by employing a roulette wheel, the AA approach reintroduces a non-behavioral
element in the decision model, thus restricting its conceptual appeal and its scope (see
our discussion of ‘distorted probabilities’ below).
In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct a ‘subjective AA setting’ in a
fully behavioral setting like Savage’s, thus overcoming this difficulty. Our construction
holds for preferences that satisfy some mild conditions, and it requires that the set of
possible outcomes be sufficiently rich (e.g., an interval in the real line). If these conditions
are met, ‘subjective mixtures’ of acts can be constructed using only behavioral data. More
details on this construction are given below.
As an illustration of our technique, we employ subjective mixtures to offer simple
axiomatizations of the CEU and MEU models (of which SEU is a special case), as well as
of Bewley’s model. Essentially, our main result allows us to state and characterize axioms
as if the analysis was carried out in the AA setting. However, we do not need roulette
wheels. Clearly, other fruitful applications of our subjective AA setting are possible.
Identifying a subjective vector structure in Savage’s setting is not merely of ‘technical’
interest. In fact, the subjective construction has at least two significant conceptual
advantages. First, it enables us to avoid the philosophically difficult concept of ‘objective’
1The acts which only depend on the behavior of the roulette wheel.
2Some of these models have later been reformulated in Savage-type settings; however, this line of
research has clearly shown that the ‘purity’ of Savage’s approach imposes substantial costs in terms of
analytical complexity.
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probability. As de Finetti and Savage argued extensively, the existence of objective
probabilities is debatable.
Second, it sidesteps a descriptive limitation of the AA framework. It is well known
that many experimental subjects do not act consistently with the expected utility model
even when choosing among roulette wheel acts: they behave as if they ‘distorted’ the
probabilities of the roulette events. Consequently, these subjects do not treat the set
of acts with objective mixtures as a convex subset of a vector space, and the axioms in
the style of von Neumann and Morgenstern become meaningless for them. Thus, the
advantage of the AA setting effectively disappears.
This is not the case with subjective mixtures, as the notion of subjective mixture
is unrelated to external objects, which could be interpreted differently by the decision
maker and the modeller. For any preference relation that satisfies our minimal conditions,
the subjective vector structure of the set of acts can be observed by the modeller.
Preference Averages and Subjective Mixtures of Acts
The key step in our construction of subjective mixtures of acts is the notion of a ‘pref-
erence average’ of two outcomes. In our interpretation, a preference average of two
outcomes x and y is an outcome z with the following property: if x and y are possible
results which play a symmetric role in the decision maker’s evaluation of a bet, then
replacing x and y with z leaves the decision maker indifferent. This appears to us to con-
stitute a sensible behavioral definition of the midpoint of the preference interval between
two outcomes.
To see how a preference average is practically observed, fix an event E, and consider
the decision maker’s preferences over the bets on E, i.e., uncertain prospects of the form
xE y =‘receive x if E obtains, and y otherwise’, where outcome x is (weakly) preferred
to outcome y. Take E to be ‘non-trivial’; that is, for some pair x and y such that x is
strictly preferred to y the bet xE y is strictly between x and y. Also, assume that every
xE y has a certainty equivalent cxEy.
Given two such outcomes x and y, suppose that z is a third outcome that satisfies
the following condition:
xE y is indifferent to cxEz E czEy. (1)
Under mild assumptions on the decision maker’s preference, such a z exists for every
x and y. We now argue that the same assumptions allow us to interpret z as a ‘preference
average’ of x and y.
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Since xE y is trivially indifferent to cxExE cyEy, we have that
cxExE cyEy is indifferent to cxEz E czEy. (2)
Substituting z for the inner x and y in the ‘compound’ act on the left-hand side leaves
the decision maker indifferent; thus, z is a ‘local’ certainty equivalent for x and y.3
Moreover, our preference axioms imply that the inner outcomes in the ‘compound’
bets in Eq. (2) have the same impact on the decision maker’s evaluation. Formally, if z′
and z′′ are both between x and y in preference, then
cxEz′ E cz′′Ey is indifferent to cxEz′′ E cz′Ey.
In words, permuting z′ and z′′ does not affect the decision maker’s preferences: the two
inner outcomes play a symmetric role in his evaluation of these bets.
We conclude that z is a local certainty equivalent for x and y in a situation in which
x and y have the same impact on the decision maker’s preferences over bets on the same
event E. Therefore, z fits our intuitive description of a preference average of x and y.
To see this from a different perspective, we remark that the same mild assumptions
on preferences imply that there exists a cardinal utility u on the set of outcomes and a
number ρ(E) ∈ (0, 1) such that xE y is preferred to x′E y′ if and only if4
u(x) ρ(E) + u(y) (1− ρ(E)) ≥ u(x′) ρ(E) + u(y′) (1− ρ(E)). (3)
Using this representation, it is simple to show that z satisfies Eq. (1) if and only if
u(z) =
1
2
u(x) +
1
2
u(y). (4)
The key step in the proof is the quantitative counterpart to the intuition provided above:
The inner outcomes x and y in the act cxExE cyEy and the z’s in the act cxEz E czEy
all receive the same ‘weight’ according the evaluation functional described by Eq. (3).
(Notice that Eq. (4) also implies that the notion of preference average is independent of
the ‘non-trivial’ event E that we use to construct it.)
The preference average described above corresponds to the 1
2
: 1
2
mixture of two
outcomes. It is clear that by iterating our definition, arbitrary dyadic mixtures may
be defined. Finally, we can use these dyadic mixtures of outcomes to define subjective
mixtures of acts state by state, as in the AA framework.
3This terminology is justified by noting that v is a (global) certainty equivalent of wE w′ if v E v is
indifferent to wE w′.
4We emphasize that the following representation only holds for bets on E (acts of the form xE y with
x (weakly) preferred to y). As the results in Sections 3 and 4 indicate, our axioms allow considerable
flexibility in the evaluation of all other acts.
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Related Literature and Organization of the Paper
This paper is not first in remarking the advantages of identifying an algebraic structure in
the choice set. A few other papers have attempted to build a vector structure in Savage’s
setting. Most notable is the work of Gul [12] (later extended by Chew and Karni [5] and
Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff and Ozdenoren [4]). His main objective is to provide an
axiomatization of SEU which, differently from Savage’s, does not require the state space
to be infinite. As we do, he requires that the set of outcomes be infinite and that every
bet have a certainty equivalent. He then assumes the existence of an ‘ethically neutral’
event A such that the preference over bets on A have an SEU representation assigning
probability 1/2 to it. Then, it is natural to call a certainty equivalent of the bet xAy
the ‘eventwise’ preference average of x and y.
The major difference with Gul’s paper lies in the use of the notion of preference av-
erage. Gul employs it as a technical device to derive a cardinal utility function over
outcomes, which is then used to explicitly construct probabilities and show that prefer-
ences admit a SEU representation. In contrast, we show that it can be used to endow the
set of acts with an AA-style algebraic structure. As a result, the usual axiomatics and
functional-analytic machinery deliver the characterization results with minimal effort (cf.
Prop. 9).
There is also a significant difference between the two notions of preference average.
Suppose that we need to observe the preference average of two outcomes x and y for two
decision makers, one satisfying our model and one satisfying Gul’s. For the former, we
apply the condition explained above using some ‘non-trivial’ event E. For the latter, it is
necessary to find an event A such that the decision maker satisfies SEU over all the bets
on A. Since the elicitation of such event A involves the observation of infinitely many
comparisons, our construction of preference averages is clearly more direct than that of
eventwise preference averages, therefore much easier to interpret and implement.
As to the extensions of Gul’s work, Chew and Karni [5] show that assuming that the
bets on A satisfy SEU and that A is ‘ethically neutral’ is not necessary to obtain a SEU
(and CEU) representation. Such generalization prevents the construction of a vector
space structure over the set of acts,5 which is anyway not an objective of their work.
In an axiomatization of the MEU model that generalizes Gul’s, Casadesus-Masanell et
al. [4] assume that the bets on A satisfy SEU (but not that A is ethically neutral). They
do not suggest iterating eventwise preference averages to induce an algebraic structure
over acts. On the other hand, in the companion paper [3] Casadesus-Masanell et al.
do explicitly attempt to build a vector structure in Savage’s setting, in order to retain
the spirit of the axiomatization of MEU in the AA setting. Their notion of subjective
mixtures is based on standard sequences, and is therefore less immediate than the one
we present. The same is said of the relative interpretations of the axioms.
5If f and g do not dominate each other statewise, there are s and s′ such that f(s)Ag(s) and
f(s′)Ag(s′) are bets on different events. Intuitively: we are mixing with different weights in different
states.
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Machina [14] moves along a different direction in showing how to construct ‘almost-
objective’ events in a Savage-style setting. He assumes that the state space has a Eu-
clidean structure, and that preferences satisfy an ‘event smoothness’ condition; he then
constructs sequences of events that, in the limit, are treated by the decision-maker ‘as
if’ they had an ‘objective’ (agreed upon) probability. He investigates the properties of
almost-objective events, and also suggests constructing almost-objective mixtures of acts.6
The latter differ from our subjective mixtures, in that they do not yield a preference av-
erage of the outcomes in every state, and do not induce an algebraic structure over the
set of acts.
A secondary contribution of this paper is the introduction of simple axiomatic char-
acterizations of the CEU, MEU, and Bewley’s models in Savage’s setting. To the best
of our knowledge, there are no axiomatizations of the latter in Savage’s setting. There
exist several axiomatizations of the CEU model in Savage’s setting (e.g., Gilboa [10],
Nakamura [16] and Chew and Karni [5]), while Casadesus-Masanell et al. [3, 4] contain
the only axiomatizations of MEU. The main advantage of our characterizations lies in
their simplicity.
Finally, this paper improves over Ghirardato and Marinacci [9] by showing how to
refine their ‘biseparable preferences’ model in order to guarantee the uniqueness of what
they call ‘the canonical functional’ (see also Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci [7]).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the required terminology and
notation. Section 2 is the core of the paper. It introduces the notion of subjective mixture
formally, as well as the preference conditions that are needed to make it consistent.
Section 3 presents the axiomatizations of the CEU, SEU and MEUmodels, while Section 4
looks at Bewley’s model. The appendices contain the proofs of the results in the main
text, as well as some more technical material.
1 Preliminaries
Consider a set S of states of the world, an algebra Σ of subsets of S called events, and
a set X of consequences. We denote by F the set of all the simple acts: finite-valued
functions f : S → X which are measurable with respect to Σ. For x ∈ X we define
x ∈ F to be the constant act such that x(s) = x for all s ∈ S. So, with the usual slight
abuse of notation, we identify X with the subset of the constant acts in F . Also, given
x, y ∈ X and A ∈ Σ, we use xAy to denote the binary act which yields x if s ∈ A and y
otherwise.
We model the DM’s preferences on F by a binary relation <. A functional V : F → R
represents < if V (f) ≥ V (g) if and only if f < g. Clearly, a necessary condition for <
to have a representation is that it be a weak order— a complete and transitive relation
6For instance, an almost-objective mixture of two constant acts x, y is defined as a bet xE y on the
appropriate almost-objective event E.
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— so that, as customary, we can denote by ∼ and  its symmetric and asymmetric
components, respectively. V is monotonic if V (f) ≥ V (g) whenever f(s) < g(s) for all
s ∈ S.
We let B(Σ) denote the set of all real-valued Σ-measurable simple functions. Given
a functional I : B(Σ) → R, we say that I is: monotonic if ϕ ≥ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ)
for all ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ); c-linear if I(aϕ + b) = aI(ϕ) + b for all ϕ ∈ B(Σ), all a ∈ R such
that a ≥ 0, and all b ∈ R.
Next, we need to define a special class of functions on Σ. A set-function ρ on (S,Σ) is
called a capacity if it is monotone and normalized; that is, ρ(A) ≤ ρ(B) if A ⊆ B, and
ρ(∅) = 0 and ρ(S) = 1. A capacity is called a probability if it is (finitely) additive:
ρ(A ∪B) = ρ(A) + ρ(B) if A ∩B = ∅.
Finally, we have an assumption on the set of consequences that holds except where
otherwise noted.
Structural Assumption The set X is a connected and separable topological space with
topology τ .
2 Preferences with Subjective Mixtures
In this section we provide a basic characterization result for a general class of preferences
that includes most of the decision models originally formulated in an AA framework.
The axioms guarantee that the preferences have enough structure to define a ‘subjective
mixture’ operation that is the subjective equivalent of the ‘objective mixture’ in the AA
framework.
2.1 Basic Axioms
The first two axioms in the characterization are standard. First of all, we require that
the relation be a weak order.
Axiom A 1 (Weak Order) (a) For all f, g ∈ F , f < g or g < f . (b) For all f, g, h ∈
F , if f < g and g < h, then f < h.
Next, we require that the preference satisfy the behavioral equivalent of monotonicity.
Axiom A 2 (Dominance) For every f, g ∈ F , if f(s) < g(s) for every s ∈ S then
f < g.
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The next axiom requires a definition. We say that an event A ∈ Σ is essential if
x  xAy  y for some consequences x and y such that x  y.
Axiom A 3 (Essentiality) There exists an essential event E ∈ Σ.
This axiom implies that < is nontrivial, as no event is essential if < is trivial. Given E,
we denote by ΣE the algebra generated by E and by FE the set of the ΣE-measurable
acts.
We now have three axioms that impose with one exception restrictions on the DM’s
preferences over the acts in FE. The first (a weak version of Savage’s P3 [18] axiom) is a
converse to axiom A2. We use the following terminology: An event A ∈ Σ is null (resp.
universal) if y ∼ xAy (resp. x ∼ xAy) for every x  y. It follows from axiom A1 that
an event can be only one of null, essential, or universal.
Axiom A 4 (E-Monotonicity) For every non-null A ∈ ΣE and every x, y < z ∈ X,
x  y =⇒ xA z  y A z.
For every non-universal A ∈ ΣE and every x, y 4 z ∈ X,
x  y =⇒ z Ax  z A y.
The next axiom is a weak continuity property. To state it, we first observe that
the topology τ on X induces the product topology on the set XS of all functions from
S into X. In this topology, a net {fα}α∈D ⊆ XS converges to f ∈ XS if and only if
fα(s)
τ−→ f(s) for all s ∈ S (remember that S is arbitrary). For this reason it is also
called the topology of pointwise convergence.
Axiom A 5 (E-Continuity) Let {gα}α∈D ⊆ FE be a net that pointwise converges to
g. For every f ∈ F , if gα < f (resp. f < gα) for all α ∈ D, then g < f (resp. f < g).
This axiom is the announced exception, as the act f can be any element of F . It
is straightforward to show (see Lemma 12 in Appendix B) that any binary relation
satisfying axioms A1–A3 and A5 (on a connected X) has certainty equivalents. That is,
for every f ∈ F , there exists a x ∈ X such that x ∼ f . Granted this, we henceforth
denote by cf an arbitrarily chosen certainty equivalent of f ∈ F .
The next axiom imposes a behavioral restriction. We write x < {z′, z′′} (resp.
{z′, z′′} < y) if x < z′ and x < z′′ (resp. z′ < y and z′′ < y)
Axiom A 6 (E-Substitution) For all x, y, z′, z′′ ∈ X and A,B ∈ ΣE. Suppose that
x < {z′, z′′} < y. Then
cxAz′ B cz′′Ay ∼ cxBz′′ Acz′By. (5)
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Figure 1: The acts cxAz′Bcz′′ Ay and cxB z′′Acz′ By
Axioms in the spirit of our A6 are standard in the literature originating from Nakamura
[16]. Note however that axiom A6 only involves preferences on the (binary) acts in FE.7
First, Axiom A6 may be interpreted as imposing a ‘substitution’ requirement (see
Quiggin [17] for a similar interpretation of a related axiom). Recall that, following Gul
[12] and Chew and Karni [5], binary acts and their certainty equivalents may be employed
to construct statewise mixtures of acts. In this sense, the act cxAz′Bcz′′ Ay may be re-
garded as the ‘A-mixture’ of the acts xB z′′ and z′B y. On the other hand, cxB z′′Acz′ By
is the ‘A-mixture’ of the certainty equivalents of the same acts. Therefore, Eq. (5) re-
quires that substituting acts in a statewise mixture with their certainty equivalents leave
the decision maker indifferent.
An alternative interpretation of the axiom involves the idea of ‘reduction of com-
pound acts’ (see also Luce [13, Ch. 3]). Suppose that, in order to simplify the evaluation
of ‘compound’ acts such as cxAz′Bcz′′ Ay, the decision maker imagines a fictitious setting
wherein two identical copies of the experiment described by ΣE are performed simulta-
neously.8 He then reduces these acts to fictitious ‘product’ acts. In particular, he reduces
cxAz′Bcz′′ Ay (resp. cxB z′′Acz′ By) in the original setup to the fictitious act represented on
the right (resp. on the left) of Figure 1. By the simultaneity assumption, both ficticious
acts can be represented by the table in the center. Therefore, the decision maker should
be indifferent between cxAz′Bcz′′ Ay and cxB z′′Acz′ By. Thus, axiom A6 reflects one con-
sequence of the assumption that the decision maker adopts the evaluation procedure just
described. We now show that a preference < that satisfies axioms A1–A6 can be given
a representation V which on the set FE has a simple separable form (a weaker form of
the biseparable representation introduced in [9]).
Recalling the discussion in the Introduction, Axiom A6 is responsible for the fact that
the ‘internal’ outcomes z′ and z′′ have symmetric importance in the decision maker’s
evaluation of composite acts in Eq. (5).
7Chew and Karni [5] show that this axiom is equivalent to a form of comonotonic independence (cf.
axiom A9 below and axiom S2 in Ghirardato and Marinacci [9]) restricted to acts in FE .
8Simultaneity reflects the idea that in the decision maker’s mind the outcome of one experiment does
not influence the outcome of the other in any way.
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The axioms stated so far imply that the DM’s preferences over consequences have a
cardinal representation. However, we cannot say anything (beyond monotonicity) about
the structure of the functional V for acts which are not ΣE-measurable.
Lemma 1 < is a binary relation satisfying axioms A1–A6 if and only if there is a τ -
continuous nonconstant utility index u : X → R and a capacity ρE : ΣE → [0, 1], with
ρE(E) ∈ (0, 1), such that the functional V : F → R defined by V (f) ≡ u(cf ) for any
f ∈ F represents <, it is monotonic and it satisfies, for all x < y and all A ∈ ΣE,
V (xAy) = u(x)ρE(A) + u(y)(1− ρE(A)). (6)
Moreover, such u and V are unique up to a positive affine transformation and ρE is
unique.
We stress that in general ρE(E)+ρE(E
c) 6= 1; that is, the representation of the DM’s
preferences over bets on events in ΣE is not necessarily expected utility with ‘beliefs’ ρE.
2.2 Subjective Mixtures and Independence
We now introduce the key notion of the ‘subjective mixture’ of two acts using the essential
event E of axiom A3. This is then used to state the last axiom, which guarantees that this
notion of mixture is independent of the essential event E. We start with the definition
of preference average of two consequences.
Definition 2 Given x, y ∈ X such that x < y (resp. y < x), we denote by (1/2)x ⊕
(1/2) y a consequence z ∈ X such that x < z < y (resp. y < z < x) and
xE y ∼ cxEz E czEy (resp. y E x ∼ cyEz E czEx). (7)
Two remarks are in order. The first is that the definition implies that (1/2)x ⊕
(1/2) y ∼ (1/2)y ⊕ (1/2)x. The second is that there may be many consequences that
satisfy the required conditions: Lemma 3 below shows that all the consequences that
satisfy the conditions form an indifference class of <. As stated in the definition, (1/2)x⊕
(1/2) y denotes a representative of the indifference class. Nothing would change in our
results if we required every property related to mixtures to hold for every z that satisfies
the conditions in Definition 2.
We explained in the Introduction why we interpret the consequence (1/2)x⊕ (1/2) y
as the preference average of x and y. We now show that the consequence z averages the
utilities of x and y with the cardinal utility index u provided by Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose that < satisfies axioms A1–A6. For any x, y ∈ X, there exists a
z = (1/2)x⊕ (1/2)y. Moreover, if u is the cardinal utility that represents < by Lemma 1,
z is an arbitrarily chosen element of the set of the z′ satisfying
u(z′) =
1
2
u(x) +
1
2
u(y).
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Clearly, we can consider iterated averages such as (1/2)x ⊕ (1/2)[(1/2)x ⊕ (1/2) y],
which is tantamount to a 3/4:1/4 mixture of x and y. More generally, consider any
dyadic rational: a number γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for some finite N ,
γ =
N∑
i=1
ai/2
i,
where ai ∈ {0, 1} for every i and aN = 1. We use γ x⊕ (1− γ) y as a short-hand for the
iterated preference average
1
2
z1 ⊕ 1
2
(
. . .
(
1
2
zN−1 ⊕ 1
2
(
1
2
zN ⊕ 1
2
y
))
. . .
)
,
where for every i, zi = x if ai = 1 and zi = y otherwise. The mixture of acts f and g is
now defined as the act which state by state pays the mixture of the payoffs of f and g.
Definition 4 Given f, g ∈ F and a dyadic rational γ, we define γf ⊕ (1− γ) g the act
h ∈ F such that h(s) = γf(s) ⊕ (1− γ) g(s) for every s ∈ S.
It follows from this definition (see Lemma 13 in Appendix B) that for every f, g ∈ F
and s ∈ S,
u[(γf ⊕ (1− γ)g)(s)] = γu(f(s)) + (1− γ)u(g(s)).
That is, the act γf ⊕ (1− γ) g is the act whose utility profile mixes with weight γ those
of f and g. This act has a utility profile which is identical to that of the ‘objectively
mixed’ act γf + (1− γ) g in the AA framework. The difference is that in our framework
the mixture has the correct convex combination of utilities by definition, rather than by
assumption.
Our final axiom uses the notion of mixture thus derived to impose a very weak and
natural property of separability of preferences.
Axiom A 7 (Weak Certainty Independence) For every f, g ∈ F , x ∈ X and dyadic
rational γ,
f ∼ g =⇒ γ f ⊕ (1− γ)x ∼ γ g ⊕ (1− γ)x. (8)
This axiom is a (weaker) ‘subjective’ version of the identically named axiom of Gilboa
and Schmeidler [11]. The interpretation is analogous: If the DM prefers f to g, he should
also prefer the mixture of f with the constant x to the mixture of g with the x. In
fact, a mixture with a constant delivers an act whose utility profile is a positive affine
transformation of the original one. The novelty in our axiom is that the mixtures used in
(8) are derived in a purely subjective fashion, so that as explained above they certainly
induce the appropriate profile of utilities.
The following result characterizes the preferences that satisfy the given axioms:
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Theorem 5 Let < be a binary relation on F . Then < satisfies axioms A1–A7 if and
only if there exist a τ -continuous nonconstant function u : X → R and a monotonic
c-linear functional I : B(Σ)→ R such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f < g ⇐⇒ I(u ◦ f) ≥ I(u ◦ g), (9)
and such that I(1E) /∈ {0, 1} for some E ∈ Σ. Moreover, u is unique up to a positive
affine transformation and I is unique.
It follows from the properties of the functional I that, setting V (f) = I(u ◦ f), for
every f ∈ F and x ∈ X and dyadic rational γ,
V (γ f ⊕ (1− γ)x) = γ V (f) + (1− γ)V (x). (10)
It can also be shown (Proposition 14 in Appendix B) that the functional V satisfies the
separable representation of Lemma 1 for every binary act (rather than just those in FE).
In fact, let ρ : Σ → R be defined by ρ(A) ≡ I(1A). Then ρ is a capacity and for all
x, y ∈ X such that x < y and all A ∈ Σ,
V (xAy) = u(x)ρ(A) + u(y)(1− ρ(A)). (11)
Moving beyond binary acts, though, the representation in Theorem 5 allows a great
degree of flexibility. Indeed, we show in the next section that both the CEU and MEU
models are encompassed by it. Moreover, it is immediate to modify the discussion in
Ghirardato and Marinacci [9] to show that most of the decision models which deliver a
cardinal state-independent utlity function are special cases of this representation.
The observation of Eq. (11) enables us to address the question of whether the defini-
tion of subjective mixture depends on the choice of the essential event E. In general, this
is possible even if the preference < satisfies axioms A1–A6. However, such dependence
is ruled out when axiom A7 is added (see also Remark 8 below):
Corollary 6 Suppose that < satisfies axioms A1–A7 and let F 6= E be an essential
event. Then for every x < z < y,
xE y ∼ cxEz E czEy if and only if xF y ∼ cxFz F czFy.
That is, for a preference satisfying axioms A1–A7 the definition of 1/2:1/2 (hence
dyadic) mixture is independent of the choice of essential event E.
Remark 7 In view of the potential dependence of ‘subjective mixtures’ on the essential
event E, one could envision a stronger version of axiom A7 that requires that implication
(8) hold for the mixtures defined using any essential event. Corollary 6 shows that
all such mixtures agree whenever certainty independence holds for the mixtures defined
using E. Hence, the alternative formulation of the axiom is not stronger than axiom A7.
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In conclusion, we have shown that under weak preference axioms it is possible to con-
struct a subjective version of the algebraic structure that is assumed in the AA framework.
In the next section, we extend three axiomatic models from the AA framework to a fully
subjective one, by way of illustrations of the usefulness of this construction.
While the axiomatization that we propose is designed mostly with generality in mind,
it is perhaps worth remarking that it is stronger than what is necessary for correctly
defining subjective mixtures. In fact, we show in Section 4 that the completeness part
of axiom A1 to a large extent can be relaxed without affecting subjective mixtures. The
next remark observes that, analogously, the full strength of certainty independence is not
needed.
Remark 8 The independence of the notion of even mixture from the essential event
E follows from Eq. (11), not from the other properties of the functional I. Therefore,
the subjective foundation to the AA framework presented here can be extended to the
more general ‘biseparable preferences’ model of Ghirardato and Marinacci [9]. The main
benefit of the model introduced here is that the functional I is independent of the specific
representation V (which is not necessarily the case for general biseparable preferences).
The main cost is the certainty independence property, which is weak and it is satisfied
by most models of decision under uncertainty.
3 Some Immediate Consequences
It is simple to build on the characterization in Section 2 to provide an axiomatic founda-
tion of some popular models of decision making under uncertainty in a fully subjective
environment.
We start with the axiomatization of the classical SEU model of Anscombe and Au-
mann [1], as well as that of the CEU model of Schmeidler [19]. The key step to obtaining
a SEU preference is requiring that axiom A7 hold for every triple of acts:
Axiom A 8 (Weak Independence) For every f, g, h ∈ F ,
f ∼ g =⇒ 1
2
f ⊕ 1
2
h ∼ 1
2
g ⊕ 1
2
h.
On the other hand, CEU follows if we weaken axiom A8 by requiring that the implica-
tion holds only for acts which are ‘commonly monotonic’, in the following sense: f, g ∈ F
are comonotonic if there are no s, s′ ∈ S such that f(s)  f(s′) and g(s′)  g(s).
Axiom A 9 (Weak Comonotonic Independence) For every f, g, h ∈ F , such that
f, g and h are pairwise comonotonic,
f ∼ g =⇒ 1
2
f ⊕ 1
2
h ∼ 1
2
g ⊕ 1
2
h.
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Notice that, differently from axiom A7, both these axioms require that the implications
hold only for γ = (1/2).
In either case, the functional I of Theorem 5 becomes a Choquet integral with respect
to a function that represents the DM’s beliefs.9 Depending on whether independence
holds only for comonotonic acts or for all acts, such function is either a capacity or a
probability.
Proposition 9 Let < be a binary relation on F . Then < satisfies axioms A1–A6 and
A8 (resp. A9) if and only if there exist a τ -continuous nonconstant function u : X → R
and a probability (resp. capacity) P on Σ such that the functional I : B(Σ)→ R defined
by
I(ϕ) =
∫
S
ϕdP,
represents < in the sense of Eq. (9), and such that P (E) ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, u is unique
up to a positive affine transformation and P is unique.
Next, we offer a subjective axiomatization of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s maxmin ex-
pected utility model [11]. Here it is key to add the following axiom, which is analogous
(but slightly weaker) to the axiom Gilboa and Schmeidler call ‘uncertainty aversion’.10
Axiom A 10 (Ambiguity Hedging) For every f, g ∈ F ,
f ∼ g =⇒ 1
2
f ⊕ 1
2
g < f.
Intuitively, a DM displays ambiguity hedging if he prefers the ‘even mixture’ of indif-
ferent acts (which possibly hedges ambiguity) to either of the ‘pure’ acts (which certaintly
do not). A symmetric axiom, called ‘ambiguity speculating’, describes a DM with oppo-
site preferences.
It is worth underscoring that, since the mixtures used in the axiom are subjective,
ambiguity hedging does not describe, as its counterpart in the AA framework, a prefer-
ence for ‘objective’ randomization. Rather, it embodies a preference for utility smoothing,
which is completely unrelated to the decision maker’s attitude towards possible random-
ized choices. The latter interpretation makes, at least in our opinion, ambiguity hedging
a much more palatable property than its AA analogue.
Adding axiom A10 to those in the previous section allows a full description of the
functional I in Theorem 5. (If we used ‘ambiguity speculating’ instead, we would get a
‘max’ rather than a ‘min’.)
9 See Appendix A for a definition, and notice that a Choquet integral with respect to a probability
is a standard integral.
10 See Ghirardato and Marinacci [8] for a discussion of such terminology, motivating our departure
from it.
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Proposition 10 Let < be a binary relation on F . Then < satisfies axioms A1–A7
and A10 if and only if there exist a τ -continuous nonconstant function u : X → R
and a nonempty, closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ such that the functional
I : B(Σ)→ R defined by
I(ϕ) = min
P∈C
∫
S
ϕdP,
represents < in the sense of Eq. (9), and such that [minP∈C P (E),maxP∈C P (E)] ⊆ (0, 1).
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and C is unique.
4 A Subjective Axiomatization of Bewley’s Model
In this final section, we modify the model of Section 2 to provide a subjective foundation
to Bewley’s [2] model of choice with incomplete preferences.
Besides showing that the full strength of completeness is not necessary for defining
subjective mixtures, the exercise serves the purpose of demonstrating that subjective mix-
tures can be helpful in modelling choice also when ambiguity aversion is not a motivating
factor. In fact, incompleteness of preferences may plausibly be due to causes unrelated
to ambiguity. Moreover, the model we present here does not embody ambiguity aver-
sion, as it remains agnostic on the procedure by which the DM resolves incomparabilities
(one possible solution is Bewley’s ‘inertia’ assumption, which does not reflect ambiguity
aversion).
For this section only, we add further structure to the set of consequences X. We also
assume, as Bewley [2] did, that S is finite.
Structural Assumption The set X is a connected, separable and compact topological
space with topology τ . The set S is finite.
As in Section 2, our axiomatization comprises seven axioms, labelled B1–B7. Axioms
B2, B4 and B6 are exactly axioms A2, A4 and A6. Therefore, we do not restate them. We
only state the axioms which, though analogous to their ‘A’ counterpart, need adaptation
to the present setting. The first two axioms parallel axioms A1 and A3, but here we
require that < is complete only on the set of the acts measurable with respect to the
essential event E.
Axiom B 1 (Preorder) (a) For all f ∈ F , f < f . (b) For all f, g, h ∈ F , if f < g
and g < h, then f < h.
Axiom B 3 (Complete Essentiality) There exists an essential event E ∈ Σ such that
< is complete on FE.
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The next axiom imposes a stronger continuity requirement than axiom A5, needed in
order to compensate the incompleteness of <.
Axiom B 5 (Continuity) Let {fα}α∈D ⊆ F be a net that pointwise converges to f ∈ F
and {gα}α∈D ⊆ F be a net that pointwise converges to g ∈ F . If fα < gα for all α ∈ D,
then f < g.
As before, it is possible to show that if < satisfies axioms B1, B2, B3 and B5, every act
f ∈ FE has a certainty equivalent cf (notice that this need not be true of acts outside
FE).
As all acts involved in the definition of (1/2)x⊕ (1/2)y belong to FE, the definition
of mixture is unchanged from the previous section. We can thus state the independence
axiom, which is stronger than the previous versions, as it applies to every triple of acts.
Axiom B 7 (Independence) For every f, g, h ∈ F and every dyadic rational γ,
f < g =⇒ γ f ⊕ (1− γ)h < γ g ⊕ (1− γ)h.
Our last result shows that, unsurprisingly, axioms B1–B7 yield a representation of
preferences weaker than Proposition 9: a DM satisfying the axioms has a family of
probabilities as beliefs, and prefers act f to act g when the expected utility of f is
unanimously greater than the expected utility of g.
Theorem 11 Let < be a binary relation on F . Then < satisfies axioms B1–B7 if and
only if there exist a τ -continuous nonconstant function u : X → R and a nonempty,
closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ such that for all f, g ∈ F ,
f < g ⇐⇒
∫
S
(u ◦ f) dP ≥
∫
S
(u ◦ g) dP for all P ∈ C,
and such that P (E) = P ′(E) ∈ (0, 1) for all P, P ′ ∈ C for some E ∈ Σ. Moreover, u is
unique up to a positive affine transformation and C is unique.
It is simple to see that a result analogous to Corollary 6 holds in this setting: If F 6= E
is an essential event such that < is complete on FF , then xF y ∼ cxFz F czFy if and only
if xE y ∼ cxEz F czEy.
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Appendix A An Integral for Capacities
The notion of integral used for capacities is the Choquet integral: For a given Σ-
measurable function ϕ : S → R, the Choquet integral of ϕ with respect to a capacity ν
is defined as:∫
S
ϕdν =
∫ ∞
0
ν({s ∈ S : ϕ(s) ≥ α})dα+
∫ 0
−∞
[1− ν({s ∈ S : ϕ(s) ≥ α})]dα (12)
where the r.h.s. is a Riemann integral (which is well defined because ν is monotone).
When ν is additive, (12) becomes a standard (additive) integral. In general it is seen to
be monotonic, positive homogeneous and comonotonic additive: If ϕ, ψ : S → R are
comonotonic, then
∫
(ϕ+ψ) dν =
∫
ϕdν+
∫
ψ dν. Two functions ϕ, ψ : S → R are called
comonotonic if there are no s, s′ ∈ S such that ϕ(s) > ϕ(s′) and ψ(s) < ψ(s′).
Appendix B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We show that axioms A1–A6 imply that axioms 1-6 of Nakamura [16] hold on FE.
Axiom A2 immediately implies that axioms 1 and 4 are satisfied. The fact that our
axiom A4 is equivalent to his 3 follows from these simple observations: an event A is
‘null’ (resp. ‘universal’) in the sense of Nakamura if and only if Ac is universal (resp.
null), while if A is essential, then Ac ∈ ΣE is neither ‘null’ nor ‘universal’ in his sense.
Axiom 6 is clearly equivalent to our axiom A6.
To show that his axioms 2 and 5 hold, we use the following lemma. As it is analogous
to Lemma 29 in [9], we omit its proof.
Lemma 12 Let < be a binary relation satisfying axioms A1, A2, A3 and A5. If X is
connected, then
(a) for every f ∈ F there exists x ∈ X such that f ∼ x.
(b) for every x, y, z ∈ X, A ∈ ΣE, and f ∈ F , if xA z  f  y A z, there exists x′ ∈ X
such that x′Az ∼ f .
Part (b) is exactly Nakamura’s axiom 2. As to axiom 5, it is possible to mimic the proof
of Lemma 30 of [9] to show that Lemma 12 and axiom A4 imply its validity.
It now follows from Theorem 1 of Nakamura [16] that there exists a unique ρE on ΣE
and a function u : X → R, unique up to positive affine transformations, such that the
functional V : FE → R defined by Eq. (6) represents < on FE. We extend V to all of
F by letting V (f) = u(cf ) for any f ∈ F . It is immediate to check that, thus defined,
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V represents <. Moreover, u is shown to be τ -continuous (see the proof of Lemma 31 in
[9]).
The necessity of axioms A1–A2 is obvious, and that of axiom A6 is proved in [16,
Theorem 1]. As to axiom A3, it suffices to observe that since ρE(E) ∈ (0, 1) and u is
nonconstant, we have
u(x) > u(x) ρE(E) + u(y)(1− ρE(E)) > u(y),
for some x  y, proving that E is essential. Axiom A4 similarly follows from the obser-
vation that A ∈ ΣE is null (resp. universal) iff ρE(A) = 0 (resp. ρE(A) = 1). To show
that axiom A5 holds, assume that fα = xαE yα → xE y = f pointwise and that fα < g.
Since u is τ -continuous, we have that
max{|u(xα)− u(x)|, |u(yα)− u(y)|} → 0.
Consequently, u ◦ (xαE yα)→ u ◦ (xE y) uniformly, whence
V (fα) =
∫
[u ◦ (xαE yα)] dρE →
∫
[u ◦ (xE y)] dρE = V (f),
where the integrals are taken in the sense of Choquet [6]. This shows that f < g, and
concludes the proof of necessity.
The uniqueness of V is shown as follows: Suppose that V ′ : F → R is another
functional satisfying the representation, which corresponds to a utility u′ and capacity
ρ′E. By the uniqueness properties mentioned above, u
′ = au+ b for a > 0 and b ∈ R and
ρ′E = ρE. Therefore
V ′(f) = u′(cf ) = au(cf ) + b = aV (f) + b.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Assume w.l.o.g. that x < y, and suppose that there is a z satisfying the conditions of
Definition 2. By axiom A2 and the fact that x < z < y, it follows that xE z < z E y.
Let r = ρE(E) ∈ (0, 1). Applying the representation of Lemma 1, we have
V (xE z) = u(x)r + u(z)(1− r)
V (z E y) = u(z)r + u(y)(1− r).
Using these equations, we obtain
V (cxEz E czEy) = u(cxEz)r + u(czEy)(1− r)
= V (xEz)r + V (zEy)(1− r)
= [u(x)r + u(z)(1− r)]r + [u(z)r + u(y)(1− r)](1− r)
= u(x)r2 + u(y)(1− r)2 + 2u(z)r(1− r),
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and
V (xE y) = u(x)r + u(y)(1− r)
= u(x)r2 + u(y)(1− r)2 + [u(x) + u(y)]r(1− r).
Thus, V (xE y) = V (cxEz E czEy) is equivalent to
u(x) + u(y)
2
= u(z). (13)
By the continuity of u and the connectedness of X, for all x < y there exists a z ∈ X
such that Eq. (13) is satisfied. By the above argument, such z = (1/2)x⊕ (1/2)y.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Let u and V be respectively the utility and functional from Lemma 1. We start with a
simple observation on dyadic mixtures:
Lemma 13 Let x, y ∈ X and γ be a dyadic rational. Then
u(γ x⊕ (1− γ) y) = γ u(x) + (1− γ)u(y).
Proof : If γ =
∑∞
i=1 ai/2
i, define `(γ) = max{i ≥ 1 : ai = 1}. The proof is by induction
on `(γ). If `(γ) = 1, then γ = 1/2 and the result follows from Lemma 3.
Suppose that the result holds for all γ such that `(γ) ≤ n, and let γ = ∑n+1i=1 ai/2i
(where an+1 = 1, otherwise the result is true by the induction hypothesis). Let δ =∑n
i=1 ai+1/2
i, so that γ = (1/2)a1 + (1/2)δ. Then,
u(γx⊕ (1− γ)y) = u
(
1
2
z1 ⊕ 1
2
(δx⊕ (1− δ)y)
)
=
1
2
u(z1) +
1
2
(δu(x) + (1− δ)u(y))
If a1 = 0 (resp. a1 = 1), then z1 = y (resp. z1 = x) and the above equation is rewritten
as
u(γx⊕ (1− γ)y) = 1
2
δ u(x) + (1− 1
2
δ)u(y) (resp. = (
1
2
+
1
2
δ)u(x) +
1
2
(1− δ)u(y))
= γ u(x) + (1− γ)u(y).
This concludes the proof.
Since u is nonconstant, we can choose u s.t. u(X) ⊇ [−1, 1]. Denote by B(Σ, u(X))
the subset of B(Σ) consisting of simple measurable functions with range in u(X). It is
simple to show that B(Σ, u(X)) = {u ◦ f : f ∈ F}.
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Define I ′(u ◦ f) = V (f) for all f ∈ F . Clearly, u ◦ f = u ◦ g iff u(f(s)) = u(g(s))
for all s ∈ S iff f(s) ∼ g(s) for all s ∈ S only if V (f) = V (g) (by axiom A2). Hence,
I ′ : B(Σ, u(X)) → R is well defined. It is also monotonic: If ϕ = u ◦ f and ψ = u ◦ g
and ϕ ≥ ψ, then u(f(s)) ≥ u(g(s)) for all s ∈ S, which by axiom A2 implies f < g so
that I ′(ϕ) = I ′(u ◦ f) = V (f) ≥ V (g) = I ′(u ◦ g) = I ′(ψ). Finally, for every b = u(x) for
x ∈ X, I ′(b) = I ′(u(x)) = V (x) = u(x) = b.
Take a dyadic rational γ, a ϕ = u ◦ f ∈ B(Σ, u(X)) and b ∈ u(X). Denote by x an
element in X such that u(x) = b. By Lemma 13,
u ◦ (γ f ⊕ (1− γ)x) = γ u ◦ f + (1− γ)u(x) = γ ϕ+ (1− γ) b.
By axiom A7, f ∼ cf implies γ f ⊕ (1− γ)x ∼ γ cf ⊕ (1− γ)x. We thus obtain
I ′(γ ϕ+ (1− γ) b) = V (γ f ⊕ (1− γ)x)
= u(γ cf ⊕ (1− γ)x)
= γ V (f) + (1− γ)u(x)
= γ I ′(ϕ) + (1− γ) b.
In particular, setting b = 0 in the equation above yields I ′(γ ϕ) = γ I ′(ϕ).
We now extend I ′ to a functional I : B(Σ)→ R as follows:
I(ψ) = 2nI ′(
1
2n
ψ) if
1
2n
ψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)).
I is well defined: if (1/2m)ψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)) for, say, m = n+ p, then, using the facts that
1/2p is dyadic and that (1/2n)ψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)),
2mI(
1
2m
ψ) = 2n2pI(
1
2p
1
2n
ψ) = 2nI(
1
2n
ψ).
We now show that I(γϕ + (1 − γ)b) = γI(ϕ) + (1 − γ)b for every dyadic rational
γ, every ϕ ∈ B(Σ) and every b ∈ R. Let q ∈ N be such that ϕ/2q ∈ B(Σ, u(X)) and
b/2q ∈ u(X). Then
I(γ ϕ+ (1− γ) b) = 2q I ′(γ ϕ/2q + (1− γ) b/2q)
= 2q[γ I ′(ϕ/2q) + (1− γ) b/2q]
= γ 2q I ′(ϕ/2q) + (1− γ) b
= γ I(ϕ) + (1− γ) b.
As a consequence of this equality, I(ϕ/2) = I(ϕ)/2 for every ϕ ∈ B(Σ). Using this result
and the equality again yields I(ϕ+ b) = I(ϕ) + b. Therefore I is c-additive.
The monotonicity of I descends from the monotonicity of I ′. Sup-norm continuity of
I then follows from monotonicity and c-additivity. The positive homogeneity of I then
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follows from the property that I(γϕ) = γI(ϕ) for every dyadic rational γ and sup-norm
continuity. We thus conclude that I is c-linear, proving sufficiency.
To prove necessity, we show that the representation V has a special form on all binary
acts.
Proposition 14 Let < be the binary relation on F induced by the functional V defined by
V (f) = I(u(f)), where I : B(Σ)→ R is a monotonic c-linear functional and u : X → R
is a nonconstant function. Then there exists a unique capacity ρ : Σ → [0, 1] such that
for every x < y and A ∈ Σ,
V (xAy) = u(x)ρ(A) + u(y)(1− ρ(A)). (14)
Proof : Set ρ(A) = I(1A) for all A ∈ Σ. Consider x < y and A ∈ Σ. Then
V (xAy) = I[u ◦ (xAy)]
= I[(u(x)− u(y))1A + u(y)]
= u(x)ρ(A) + u(y)(1− ρ(A)).
To show uniqueness, assume that ρ′ also satisfies Eq. (14) and choose x  y. We have
ρ′(A) =
V (xAy)− u(y)
u(x)− u(y)
=
I[(u(x)− u(y)) 1A + u(y)]− u(y)
u(x)− u(y)
=
u(x)− u(y)
u(x)− u(y) I(1A),
which concludes the proof.
Since the proposition shows that the utility u and capacity ρ are such that V satisfies
Eq. (6), it now follows from Lemma 1 that axioms A1–A6 must hold. Axiom A7 is clearly
necessary.
We close with the proof of the uniqueness of I and cardinality of u. By the proposition
and Lemma 1, V and u are cardinal and ρE = ρ. Suppose that I
′ : B(Σ) → R and u′
correspond to another representation of <. Then, V ′ = I ′ ◦ u′ = aV + b with a > 0 and
b ∈ R and for all f ∈ F
aI(u ◦ f) + b = I ′(u′ ◦ f) = I ′(a(u ◦ f) + b) = aI ′(u ◦ f) + b.
This shows that I ′ = I on B(Σ, u(X)). By positive homogeneity, I ′ ≡ I.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 9
We prove the statement for the case of a preference satisfying axioms A1–A6 and A9.
The other case is proved analogously (just remove all references to ‘comonotonic’ and
change ‘capacity’ into ‘probability’).
As in the proof of Theorem 5, we consider the utility u and functional V from
Lemma 1, chosen so that u(X) ⊇ [−1, 1]. Observe that then f, g ∈ F are comonotonic iff
u◦f and u◦g are comonotonic. We next define I ′(u◦f) = V (f) for all f ∈ F . As before,
I ′ is well-defined and monotonic, and I ′(b) = b. Given comonotonic ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)),
let ϕ = u ◦ f and ψ = u ◦ g. By Lemma 3,
u ◦ ((1/2) f ⊕ (1/2) g) = (1/2)u ◦ f + (1/2)u ◦ g = (1/2)ϕ+ (1/2)ψ.
By axiom A9, f ∼ cf and g ∼ cg imply
(1/2) f ⊕ (1/2) g ∼ (1/2) cf ⊕ (1/2) g ∼ (1/2) cf ⊕ (1/2) cg.
We thus obtain
I ′((1/2)ϕ+ (1/2)ψ) = V ((1/2) f ⊕ (1/2) g)
= u((1/2) cf ⊕ (1/2) cg)
= (1/2)V (f) + (1/2)V (g)
= (1/2) I ′(ϕ) + (1/2) I ′(ψ).
This implies I ′((1/2)ϕ) = (1/2)I ′(ϕ), so that I ′((1/2)nϕ) = (1/2)nI ′(ϕ) for all n ∈ N.
We now extend I ′ to a functional I : B(Σ)→ R as follows:
I(ψ) = 2nI ′(
1
2n
ψ) if
1
2n
ψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)).
Again, I is well defined. We now show that I((1/2)ϕ+(1/2)ψ) = (1/2) I(ϕ)+(1/2) I(ψ),
for every comonotonic ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ). Let q ∈ N be such that ϕ/2q, ψ/2q ∈ B(Σ, u(X)).
Then
I((1/2)ϕ+ (1/2)ψ) = 2q I ′((1/2)ϕ/2q + (1/2)ψ/2q)
= 2q[(1/2) I ′(ϕ/2q) + (1/2) I ′(ψ/2q)]
= (1/2) 2q I ′(ϕ/2q) + (1/2) 2qI ′(ψ/2q)
= (1/2) I(ϕ) + (1/2) I(ψ).
As a consequence of this equality, I(ϕ/2) = I(ϕ)/2 for every ϕ ∈ B(Σ). Using this result
and the equality again yields I(ϕ+ψ) = I(ϕ)+I(ψ). That is, I is comonotonic additive.
Since I is comonotonic additive, monotonic (the monotonicity of I descends from the
monotonicity of I ′) and satisfies I(b) = b for all b ∈ R, there exists a unique capacity P
on Σ such that I(ϕ) =
∫
ϕdP , where the integral is taken in the sense of Choquet. This
proves sufficiency. Necessity and uniqueness are straightforward.
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B.5 Proof of Proposition 10
Consider the function u and the monotonic c-linear functional I in Theorem 5. We now
show that, if we add axiom A10, the functional I is also superadditive. This is shown to
yield the desired representation (see, e.g., Marinacci [15]).
For all ϕ = u ◦ f and ψ = u ◦ g such that I(ϕ) = I(ψ), we have
I
(
1
2
ϕ+
1
2
ψ
)
= I
(
u ◦
(
1
2
f ⊕ 1
2
g
))
≥ I(u ◦ f) = I(ϕ) = 1
2
I(ϕ) +
1
2
I(ψ).
Given ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ), suppose first that I(ϕ) = I(ψ). Choose α ∈ (0, 1] such that αϕ, αψ ∈
B(Σ, u(X)). By the previous observation
I
(
1
2
αϕ+
1
2
αψ
)
≥ 1
2
I(αϕ) +
1
2
I(αψ),
which by homogeneity of I implies I(ϕ + ψ) ≥ I(ϕ) + I(ψ). If, on the other hand,
I(ϕ) 6= I(ψ), let γ = I(ϕ)− I(ψ) and apply c-linearity and the previous argument to ϕ
and ψ + γ. This proves the superadditivity of I.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 11
Necessity is straightforward. We prove sufficiency. We depart from the observation that,
as we did in Section 2, we can use axioms B1–B6 to show that the preference < has a
separable representation on FE. This time, however, the representation is not extendable
to all F .
Lemma 15 < is a binary relation satisfying axioms B1–B6 if and only if there is a τ -
continuous nonconstant utility index u : X → R and a capacity ρE : ΣE → [0, 1], with
ρE(E) ∈ (0, 1), such that the functional V : FE → R defined by V (f) ≡ u(cf ) for any
f ∈ FE represents <, it is monotonic and it satisfies, for all x < y and all A ∈ ΣE,
V (xAy) = u(x)ρE(A) + u(y)(1− ρE(A)). (15)
Moreover, such u and V are unique up to a positive affine transformation and ρE is
unique.
Proof : This is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. The major difference is that only the
acts in FE necessarily have certainty equivalents.
Let u and V be respectively the utility and functional from the Lemma. Since u
is nonconstant, we can choose u s.t. u(X) ⊇ [−1, 1]. We define a binary relation on
B(Σ, u(X)) as follows: For all f, g ∈ F , we let u ◦ f %1 u ◦ g iff f < g. The following are
then true:
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• %1 is well-defined and monotonic: Assume u ◦ f = u ◦ f ′ and u ◦ g = u ◦ g′. By
monotonicity f ∼ f ′ and g ∼ g′. Then f < g iff f ′ < g′. The proof of monotonicity
is obvious.
• %1 is reflexive: for all f ∈ F , f ∼ f , hence u ◦ f ∼1 u ◦ f .
• %1 is transitive: If u ◦ f %1 u ◦ g and u ◦ g %1 u ◦ h, then f < g < h, hence f < h
implying u ◦ f %1 u ◦ h.
• %1 is continuous: Assume that u◦fα → u◦f and u◦gα → u◦g and u◦fα %1 u◦gα,
implying fα < gα, for all α ∈ D. Taking subnets we can assume that fβ → f ′ and
gβ → g′ (as F = XS is compact). By axiom B5 f ′ < g′, whence u ◦ f ′ %1 u ◦ g′.
Finally, we observe that u ◦ f ′ = u ◦ f and u ◦ g′ = u ◦ g since u ◦ fβ → u ◦ f and
u ◦ gβ → u ◦ g. This shows that u ◦ f %1 u ◦ g.
• %1 is independent (with γ ∈ [0, 1]): Let f, g, h ∈ F and suppose that u◦f %1 u◦ g.
Then f < g implying γf ⊕ (1− γ)h < γg⊕ (1− γ)h for every dyadic rational γ by
axiom B7. This implies, since clearly Lemma 13 extends to this case,
γ u ◦ f + (1− γ)u ◦ h = u ◦ (γ f ⊕ (1− γ)h)
%1 u ◦ (γ g ⊕ (1− γ)h)
= γ u ◦ g + (1− γ)u ◦ h.
By continuity, independence holds for every γ ∈ [0, 1].
Notice that, by the independence and continuity of %1, it follows that for all ϕ, ψ ∈
B(Σ, u(X)) and all γ ∈ (0, 1]: ϕ %1 ψ iff γϕ %1 γψ (the proof is similar to that of
Lemma 1.2 in Shapley and Baucells [20]).
We next define a binary relation %2 on B(Σ) as follows: For all ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ), ϕ %2 ψ
iff γ ϕ %1 γ ψ for some γ ∈ (0, 1].
• %2 is well-defined and monotonic: Let ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ) and α, β ∈ (0, 1] be such that
αϕ, βϕ, αψ, βψ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)). W.l.o.g. β = γα with γ ∈ (0, 1]. It follows from the
observation above that αϕ %1 αψ iff γαϕ %1 γαψ iff βϕ %1 βψ. Monotonicity is
trivial.
• %2 is obviously reflexive and transitive (i.e., a preorder). It is also nontrivial.
• %2 is independent and positively homogenous: For ϕ, ψ, ξ ∈ B(Σ) suppose that
ϕ %2 ψ and consider α ∈ (0, 1] such that αϕ, αψ, αξ ∈ B(Σ, u(X)). Then αϕ %1 αψ
and by independence of %1 for every γ ∈ [0, 1],
γαϕ+ (1− γ)α ξ %1 γαψ + (1− γ)α ξ ⇔ α(γ ϕ+ (1− γ) ξ) %1 α(γ ψ + (1− γ) ξ)
⇔ γ ϕ+ (1− γ) ξ %2 γ ψ + (1− γ) ξ.
The proof of positive homogeneity is now immediate.
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• %2 is continuous: Suppose that ϕn, ϕ, ψn, ψ ∈ B(Σ), ϕn → ϕ, ψn → ψ and ϕn %2
ψn.
11 Take M ∈ R such that M > supn{|ϕn(s)|, |ϕ(s)|, |ψn(s)|, |ψ(s)|} for all s ∈ S
and α ∈ (0, 1] such that αM ∈ [−1, 1]. Then αϕn %1 αψn, αϕn → αϕ and
αψn → αψ so that the continuity of%1 implies αϕ %1 αψ. In turn, this is equivalent
to ϕ %2 ψ.
The statement in the theorem now follows from a standard result whose proof we omit:
Lemma 16 % is a nontrivial, positively homogeneous, independent, continuous and
monotonic preorder on B(Σ) if and only if there exists a nonempty, closed and convex
set C of probability measures on Σ such that
ϕ % ψ ⇐⇒
∫
S
ϕdP ≥
∫
S
ψ dP for all P ∈ C.
Moreover, such C is unique.
Finally, we show that P (E) = P ′(E) for all P, P ′ ∈ C. Consider x, y ∈ X such that
u(x) = 1 and u(y) = 0 and z ∈ X such that u(z) = ρE(E). It follows from the
representation of Lemma 15 that xE y ∼ z, and from the representation of Lemma 16
that P (E) = u(z) = ρE(E) for every P ∈ C.
References
[1] Frank J. Anscombe and Robert J. Aumann. A definition of subjective probability.
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34:199–205, 1963.
[2] Truman Bewley. Knightian decision theory: Part I. Technical Report 807, Cowles
Foundation, Yale University, 1986.
[3] Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. Maxmin ex-
pected utility over savage acts with a set of priors. Journal of Economic Theory,
92:33–65, 2000.
[4] Ramon Casadesus-Masanell, Peter Klibanoff, and Emre Ozdenoren. Maxmin ex-
pected utility through statewise combinations. Economics Letters, 66:49–54, 2000.
[5] Soo Hong Chew and Edi Karni. Choquet expected utility with a finite state space:
Commutativity and act-independence. Journal of Economic Theory, 62:469–479,
1994.
[6] Gustave Choquet. Theory of capacities. Annales de l’Institut Fourier (Grenoble),
5:131–295, 1953.
11 As B(Σ) is metrizable, it is w.l.o.g. to consider sequences instead of nets.
25
[7] Paolo Ghirardato, Fabio Maccheroni, and Massimo Marinacci. A fully subjective
perspective on ambiguity. Work in progress, Caltech, Universita` Bocconi and Uni-
versita` di Torino, 2001.
[8] Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci. Ambiguity made precise:
A comparative foundation. Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
http://masada.hss.caltech.edu/∼paolo/zi2wp.pdf.
[9] Paolo Ghirardato and Massimo Marinacci. Risk, ambiguity, and the separa-
tion of utility and beliefs. Mathematics of Operations Research, forthcoming.
http://masada.hss.caltech.edu/∼paolo/canonica4wp.pdf.
[10] Itzhak Gilboa. Expected utility with purely subjective non-additive probabilities.
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 16:65–88, 1987.
[11] Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler. Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique
prior. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18:141–153, 1989.
[12] Faruk Gul. Savage’s theorem with a finite number of states. Journal of Economic
Theory, 57:99–110, 1992.
[13] R. Duncan Luce. Utility of Gains and Losses: Measurement-Theoretical and Exper-
imental Approaches. Lawrence Erlbaum, London, 2000.
[14] Mark J. Machina. Almost-objective uncertainty. Mimeo, UC San Diego, July 2001.
[15] Massimo Marinacci. A simple proof of a basic result for multiple priors. Mimeo,
University of Toronto, May 1997.
[16] Yutaka Nakamura. Subjective expected utility with non-additive probabilities on
finite state spaces. Journal of Economic Theory, 51:346–366, 1990.
[17] John Quiggin. A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 3:94–101, 1982.
[18] Leonard J. Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, New York, 1954.
[19] David Schmeidler. Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity.
Econometrica, 57:571–587, 1989.
[20] Lloyd S. Shapley and Manel Baucells. Multiperson utility. Working Paper 779,
Department of Economics, UCLA, July 1998.
[21] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, second edition, 1947.
26
